Non-Lawyer pro se litigants not to be held to same standards as a practicing lawyer
Many pro se litigants will use this in their pleadings; “Pleadings in this case are being filed by Plaintiff In Propria Persona, wherein pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicalities. Propria, pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as practicing lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner 92 Sct 594, also See Power 914 F2d 1459 (11th Cir1990), also See Hulsey v. Ownes 63 F3d 354 (5th Cir 1995). also See In Re: HALL v. BELLMON 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991).”
In Puckett v. Cox, it was held that a pro-se pleading requires less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer (456 F2d 233 (1972 Sixth Circuit USCA). Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957) “The Federal Rules rejects the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” According to Rule 8(f) FRCP and the State Court rule which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice.”
Defense against dismissal of complaint under Rule 12-B
There is legal sufficiency to show Plaintiff is entitled to relief under his Complaint. A Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) also Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1832 (1989). Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. In applying the Conley standard, the Court will “accept the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint.”
Civil Rights Vol 4, US Supreme Court Digest Page 555 Judges not totally Immune
87 SCT 1213 Pierson v. Ray
94 SCT 1683 Scheur v. Rhodes
96 SCT 984 Imbler v. Pathtman
98 SCT 2018 Monell v. Social SVS
98 SCT 2894 Butz v. Economov
A complaint is actionable against Judges under Title 42 U.S.C. 1985 (3), whose immunity does not extend to conspiracy under color of law. Section 1985(3) reaches both conspiracies under color of law and conspiracies effectuated through purely private conduct.
Many judges have a total disregard for their oath of office under Title 28 Section 453, All judges take this oath of office swearing to uphold the U.S. Constitution.
Missouri v. Mackey, 127 US 205, 8 S Ct 1161
Minneapolis v. Herrick, 127 US 210, 8 S Ct 1176
Lepper v. Texas 139 US 462, 11 S Ct 577
Giozza v Tiernan, 148 US 657, 13 S Ct 721
Duncan v Missouri, 152 US 377, 14 S Ct 570
The Fifth Amendment, provides in pertinent part that “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…” Due process is denied when a meaningful hearing is denied as in this cause.
The Seventh Amendment, provides in pertinent part that “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved…” This language does not include a single reference to “manipulation” of a jury by the Court in a conspiracy with lawyers to design a verdict suitable to the Court through the use of lawyer rules, judicial rules, court rules, or otherwise trumped-up legal technicalities and instructions which effectively “handcuffs” the jury. All of these activities are no more or less than a denial of the right to a jury of peers with the constitutional authority to judge both the facts and law in a case.
The Thirteenth Amendment, provides in pertinent part that “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime….., shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction”. These judges through their private conduct in conspiracy with the lawyer defendants, caused the Court to effectuate this Plaintiff to “Compulsory Involuntary Servitude”, an act punishable under Title 18 1584 as a criminal act.
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and Equal Protection clause (Section 1), expressly declares no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”
The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3, provides in pertinent part that “No person shall hold any office, civil or military, under the United States or under any State…..who, having previously taken an oath,….as an executive or judicial officer of any State to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same….”
USC 14th Ammendment (Deprived of the use of property)
Tracy v. Ginzberg 205 US 170, 27 S Ct. 461
Wagner v Leser, 239 US 207, 36 S Ct 66
Fuentes v. Shevin 407 US 67, 92 S Ct 1983
Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 99 S Ct 698, 11 Ohio Ops 3rd 302
Kent.Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 US 454, 109 S Ct 1904
What constitutes property protected under constitution?
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36
Buchanan v Warley, 245 US 60, 38 S Ct 16
Liggett Co. v Baldridge, 278 US 105, 49 S Ct 57
Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564, 92 S Ct 2701
On Due Process Violation 5th and 14th
Butler v. Perry, 240 US 328, 36 S Ct 288
Brinkerhoff- Faris Trust v Hill, 281 US 673, 50 S Ct 451
Curry v. McCanless, 307 US 357, 59 S Ct 900
*Rochin v California, 342 US 165, 72 S Ct 25, Alr2d 1396
*Ivanho Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 US 275, 78 S CT 1174
*Bartkus v Illinois, 359 US 121, 79 S Ct 676
*Gault 387 US 1, 87 S Ct 1428
*Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 94 S Ct 2963
**Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357, 98 S Ct 663
**Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 US 57, 101 S Ct 2646
**States v. Goodwin 457 US 368, 102 S Ct 2485
**Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157, 107 S Ct 515
**DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 US 189, 109 S Ct 998
**Collins v Harker, 112 S Ct. 1061
Jurisdiction of the case (Basic element of due process)
Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR 527
Sense of fairplay shocked is not due process (Congress Barred)
Galvan v Press, 347 US 522, 74 S Ct 737
Groban 352 US 330, 77 S Ct 510
Kinsella v United States, 361 US 234, 80 S Ct 297
Bodie v Conneticut, 401 US 371, 91 S Ct 780
Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600, 94 S Ct 2437
United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 107 S Ct 2095
14th Ammendment is the due process denial right
Collins v. Harker 112 S Ct 1061
Hebert v Louisiana, 272 US 312, 47 S Ct 103
Georgia Power v Decatur, 281 US 505, 50 S Ct 369
Discrimination as Violation of Due Process (5th Ammendment)
Bowling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 74 S Ct 693
Schneider v Rusk, 377 US 163, 84 S Ct 1187
Shipiro v Thompson 394 US 618, 89 S ct 1322
United States v Moreno, 413 US 528, 93 S Ct 2821
Johnson v Robinson 415 US 361, 94 S Ct 1160
Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 96 S Ct 612
Mathews v De Castro, 429 US 181, 97 S Ct 431
Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 100 S Ct 2758
Lyng v Castillo, 477 US 635, 106 S Ct 2727
Fourteenth Ammendment and 42 USCS 1983
Statutory requirement under color of law: Lugar v Edmondson Oil, 457 US 922, 102 S Ct 2744
Title 42 USC 1983 provides in relevant part that: “every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State….subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. ..shall be liable to the party injured….”
A Title 42 1985 action which seeks compensatory and punitive damages in conjunction with equitable relief as in this case is considered a legal claim, entititling Plaintiff to a jury trial. See An-Ti v. Michigan Technological Univ., 493 F. Supp. 1137.
Plaintiff alleges a “class based”, invidiously discriminatory animus is behind the conspirators’ action as the Court records reflect. That the actions were clearly a product of bias and prejudice of the Court. See Griffen v. Breckridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)
The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic 113 S.Ct.753 (1993) that the standard announced in Griffen was not restricted to “race” discrimination. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 1985 (3) may be used for “class-based” claims other than race which is alleged in this case.
The defendant lawyers acting in conspiracy with state actors under color of law have become state actors in this case. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that “private parties”, lawyers in this case, may be held to the same standard of “state actors” where the final and decisive act was carried out in conspiracy with a state actor or state official. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct., 183 also See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is based in part on discrimination and political affiliations by lawyers and lawyer-judges, under 42 USCA 1983 & 1985. See reversal case Acevedo-Diaz v Aponte (1993, CA1 Puerto Rico) 1 F3d 62, summary op at (CA1 Puerto Rico) 21 M.L.W. 3212, 14 R.I.L.W. 389.
Section 1985(3) under Title 42 reaches both conspiracies under color of law and conspiracies effectuated through purely private conduct. In this case Plaintiff has alleged a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus is behind the conspirators’ action as the court records reflect. That actionable cause is the treatment of a non-lawyer pro se litigant as a distinct “class-based subject” of the Court, wherein denial of equal protection of the laws and denial of due process was clearly the product of bias and prejudice of the Court. See Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993) that the standard announced in Griffen was not restricted to “race” discrimination. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 1985(3) may be used for “class-based” claims other than race as alleged in this case. It is also important to note in Bray the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the requirement under 1985(3) that a private conspiracy be one “for the purpose of depriving… any person or “class” of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, which the Court said mandates “an intent to deprive persons of a right guaranteed against private impairment.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Griffen emphasized 1985(3) legislative history was directed to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens’ rights, shall be within the scope of remedies… Id. at 100.
Supreme Court has ruled that “private parties” may be held to the same standard of “state actors” in cases such as the instant cause where the final and decisive act was carried out in conspiracy with a state official. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct., 183 and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598.
Jurisdictional Issues: It is proper for this District Court to take Jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person. See Title 28 Section 1343 (1)(2)(3)(4) .
Jurisdiction is proper under Title 28 Sections 1332, 1335, 1357, 1441 and 1603.
The First issue is “Convenience” and second issue is the “interest-of- justice” standard under 28 USCA 1406.
The Complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that Plaintiffs would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support of the claims. See Gomez v Toledo (1980, US) 64 L Ed 2d 572, 100 S Ct 1920.
The allegations of a Complaint prepared by a state prisoner acting pro se are generally taken as true for purposes of motion to dismiss. See Hughes v Rowe (1980, US) 66 L Ed 2d 163, 101 S Ct 173.
The final judgement of this Court should be vacated under Rule 60(B). The Court is requested to weigh the interest in substantial justice against the simple need for preserving finality of the judgement. See Expenditures Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institute, 1974, 500 F.2d. 808, 163 U.S. App.D.C.140. See also Brown v. Clark Equipment Co., D.C. Mc. 1982, 961 F.R.D. 166.
Court -a judgement to dismiss because of some trumped up technicality giving excuse to dismiss a non-lawyer pro se litigant’s complaint with merit in a lawyer dominated Court hearing. In support of Plaintiffs Motion to vacate Judgement, the following cases are offered; Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, (151 F2d.240) Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The ruling of the court in this case held; “Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the court should endeavor to construe the Plaintiff’s pleading without regard to technicalities.” In Walter Process Equipment v. Food Machinery 382 U.S. 172 (1965) it was held that in a “motion to dismiss”, the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted.”
Rico Case Law:
The defendants constitute an illegal enterprise in acts or threat of acts in violation of Civil Rico Federal Racketeering Act USC 18, 1961-1963 et seq. The following are particular violations:
18 USC 241: Conspiracy against Rights of Citizens:
18 USC 3: Accessory after the fact, knowing that an offense has been committed against the United States, relieves, receives, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment.
18 USC 242: Deprivation of Rights color of law of rights protected under the Constitution of the U.S.
18 USC 512: Tampering with a witness
18 USC 1341: Mail fraud
18 USC 1343: Wire fraud
18 USC 1503: Obstruction of justice
18 USC 1510: Obstructing of criminal investigation
18 USC 1513: Retaliating against a witness, victim or informant
18 USC 1951: Interference with interstate commerce
18 USC 1621: Perjury
18 USC 1001: Fraud
Continued statute of limitation in ongoing activity (conspiracy) (bankruptcy fraud)